Home » THE BANDITS ARE NOT INVISIBLE: How Nigeria’s Security Agencies Find Them In The Forests But Fail To Protect Nigerians

THE BANDITS ARE NOT INVISIBLE: How Nigeria’s Security Agencies Find Them In The Forests But Fail To Protect Nigerians

by Alien Media
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Nigerian Army

By Lillian Okenwa

The Army says a controversial encounter involving soldiers, DSS operatives and armed men in a Kwara forest secured the release of 10 kidnap victims and the recovery of 12 AK-47 rifles. But the footage raises a troubling question: if security agencies can reach the men terrorising communities, why can they not stop them before they strike?

The scene is an unlikely one. In a clearing in the Kwara bush, men in civilian clothing stand and talk with uniformed soldiers and personnel wearing DSS-marked clothing. There is no visible confrontation. They appear at ease with one another, exchanging words and moving around the gathering. The camera captures an encounter that looks remarkably informal for a meeting involving security personnel and armed men described as bandits.

The video went viral, provoking questions about what the security operatives were doing in the company of the very people they are supposed to pursue. The Nigerian Army has since explained that the encounter was deliberate. According to the Joint Task Force, Operation Savannah Shield, soldiers and Department of State Services (DSS) operatives engaged the armed men after sustained military operations had put them under pressure. The group, the Army said, was given the choice of surrendering its weapons or facing neutralisation.

The military reported that the engagement resulted in the recovery of 12 AK-47 rifles and the release of 10 kidnapped people. It rejected suggestions that the personnel were fraternising with bandits, describing the encounter as part of a non-kinetic approach to complement military operations. If the engagement secured the release of captives and persuaded armed men to surrender weapons, that outcome is welcome. Negotiation is not inherently improper in a security operation.

But the Army’s explanation has raised a question more consequential than whether the encounter looked too cordial: If the military and the DSS can locate these men, reach them in their forest hideouts and negotiate directly with them, why are Nigerians still being abducted from their homes, farms, schools and highways?

The bandits are not invisible. The state has demonstrated that it can reach at least some of them. What remains unexplained is why that access has not translated into lasting protection for the communities living under their threat.

The DSS knows where to find them. What happens to the intelligence? The presence of the DSS is particularly significant. The Service’s mandate includes preventing and detecting threats to Nigeria’s internal security, investigating terrorism and providing security intelligence to government. Its role should extend beyond establishing contact with armed groups after victims have been abducted. It should help identify criminal networks, track their movements and provide intelligence that prevents attacks.

Yet DSS operatives were present in the forest, in direct engagement with an armed group that the military says had been under sustained pressure. Was the Service already tracking the group? Did it know the location of its hideout and the identities of its commanders? How was contact established? What intelligence emerged from the meeting, and what action has followed?

The footage does not prove that the DSS knows the location of every bandit camp or could prevent every attack. But its participation in this engagement makes those questions legitimate. Nigerians need to know whether the intelligence that enabled this meeting is being used to dismantle the wider networks responsible for kidnapping and violence.

People are still being dragged from their bedrooms, farms, vehicles and communities. Some spend weeks or months in captivity while their families struggle to raise ransom. Their captors must obtain weapons, ammunition, food and information. They communicate, move through identifiable routes and maintain networks that enable them to operate.

How much of this is known to the intelligence agencies? Who supplies the weapons? Who provides information about security movements? Who finances the operations? And why are these networks not being disrupted before another family is taken hostage? The DSS should answer these questions. Its value to the country cannot be measured only by its ability to negotiate with armed men after an abduction. It must also be measured by its capacity to prevent the next one.

Kwara’s Abandoned Communities

The encounter took place against the background of a worsening security crisis in Kwara’s rural communities. In Lata Nna, Patigi Local Government Area, community leaders have said about 95 per cent of residents fled after sustained attacks. Many abandoned their homes and farms, seeking refuge in neighbouring communities. Poor telecommunications coverage, residents have complained, also makes it difficult to call for help during attacks.

In Kakafu, another community in Patigi, a woman, her daughter and granddaughter were abducted after returning for a Maulud celebration. Residents said the family had previously fled following an earlier attack. The attack on Woro in Kaiama Local Government Area in February was even more devastating. UNICEF reported that at least 200 people were killed and about 176 women and children abducted.

These figures represent more than a security crisis. They describe communities where people have lost the freedom to live, farm, travel and educate their children without fear. Families flee because remaining at home has become too dangerous. Farmers abandon their land. Children lose access to school. Traditional institutions struggle to function.

The question for the military is whether the Kwara operation will change that reality. Will the routes used by armed groups be secured? Will their camps and supply networks be dismantled? Can displaced families return without being exposed to another attack? The release of 10 captives is welcome. But it cannot be the end of the operation’s story.

Twelve Rifles: What About The Rest Of The Arsenal?

The Army has highlighted the recovery of 12 AK-47 rifles. Recovering weapons from armed criminals is a legitimate achievement, but the figure alone does not establish that the group has been disarmed or that its capacity for violence has been broken.

The weapons available to some armed groups in Nigeria extend beyond the rifles routinely displayed in security briefings. Research on banditry and arms trafficking in the region has documented access to sophisticated firearms, machine guns and, in some cases, rocket launchers. Were the 12 rifles the group’s entire arsenal, or merely the weapons surrendered during the engagement? Were other firearms and ammunition recovered? Where did the weapons come from, and who supplied them?

These questions matter because the men holding the guns are only one part of the problem. Behind them are networks that finance, transport and supply weapons, provide intelligence and sustain criminal operations. The government must investigate those networks. Disarming a group without tracing its suppliers and financiers leaves the infrastructure of violence intact. Another set of gunmen can acquire the same weapons and continue the attacks.

The Business Of Terror Survives The Rescue

The Kwara encounter also brings Nigeria’s ransom economy into focus. The 2026 SBM Intelligence report, The Economics of Nigeria’s Kidnap Industry, estimated that 7,825 people were kidnapped between July 2025 and June 2026, with at least 1,142 killed. Confirmed ransom payments reached ₦7.78 billion, although the report warned that the actual amount was likely higher because many payments were not disclosed. Kidnapping has become a source of revenue for armed groups. Ransom money can finance weapons, motorcycles, food, communication equipment, and recruitment. The proceeds from one abduction can help fund another.

Our When Terror Pays investigations have followed this cycle through the experiences of victims and their families. We reported the abduction of 24 people in the Imo-Oyo cases, including 20 prospective National Youth Service Corps members, with a reported ransom demand of ₦950 million. We also reported the abduction of six-month-old Faaiz from his parents’ bedroom in Erunmu, Egbeda Local Government Area.

These cases expose a recurring failure: the state is often more visible after an abduction than before it. Families are left to negotiate, raise money, and bear the consequences of a security system that has failed to protect them. The government cannot defeat this criminal economy by recovering rifles at surrender meetings alone. It must trace ransom payments, identify financiers, expose suppliers and prosecute those who profit from kidnapping.

Surrender Must Not Become An Escape From Justice

The Army says those who surrender will undergo security screening and applicable legal procedures. That assurance is necessary, particularly given Nigeria’s contentious experience with so-called repentant bandits.

Not everyone in an armed group has the same role. Some may have been forcibly recruited or coerced; others may have planned attacks, commanded kidnappers, collected ransom or participated in killings. The state must establish individual responsibility rather than treating surrender as proof of innocence.

Those suspected of serious crimes must be investigated and prosecuted where evidence supports charges. Victims must not be forgotten while former combatants are offered a route back into society.

Dialogue can help secure hostages and persuade armed men to abandon violence. But it must be backed by verifiable disarmament, accountability and sustained protection for affected communities. Otherwise, it risks becoming another temporary arrangement in which captives are released, weapons collected and the criminal network left intact.

That is one of the central concerns running through our When Terror Pays series: a peace process that gives armed men a way out while victims are left waiting for justice does not resolve the crisis.

What Happens After The Cameras Leave?

The Army’s account says sustained operations forced the armed group to negotiate. If that is correct, Nigerians should be told what intelligence made the operation possible, how long the group had been tracked, and whether its commanders, suppliers, and other associates have been identified.

The DSS should explain what it knew before the meeting and what it has done with the intelligence obtained. The military should clarify whether the 12 rifles represented the group’s entire arsenal and what security arrangements have been put in place to protect surrounding communities. The operation must be judged by what follows: whether the group can still abduct, kill and extort; whether its supply networks have been disrupted; and whether residents can return to their homes and farms without fear.

The video may not prove that security personnel were fraternising with bandits. The Army has offered an explanation that deserves to be examined. But the encounter has exposed a troubling contradiction. Security agencies can reach armed men in the forests, yet Nigerians continue to be taken from their homes and communities.

The military says it recovered 12 rifles and secured the release of 10 people. Those are welcome results. But for families still waiting for abducted relatives and communities forced to flee, the real measure of success is whether the violence stops. The bandits are not invisible. If the state can find them when it is time to negotiate, it must explain why it cannot stop them before they strike.

 

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