By A.G. Abubakar
Notwithstanding, in the event of the dissolution of Nigeria, just like in marriage, there are going to be winners and losers as well. The first set of winners shall be the three major ethnic groups: the Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba. These groups will have viable population sizes and attendant economic prowess as independent nation-states. To a lesser extent, the Effik, Ijaw, Kanuri (Kanem-Borno), Nupe (Kin Nupe), and Igala may join the league of such small African Republics like Eritrea, Djibouti, Mauritania or Gambia.
The Yoruba in the South West, who have been yearning for a non-violent exit, have the advantage of having an extensive marine environment. The state shall have massive seaport infrastructure (Tin Can and Apapa), a premier international airport (MMA), a huge human capital base (manpower), and a rich history of statecraft. Lagos, the former capital of Nigeria, doubles as the nation’s commercial capital and houses over 70% of its industrial and manufacturing base, with a GDP close to 30 % of the national one. Statistics also show that about 30% of the money circulation in Nigeria is confined to Lagos alone. The possible drawback may be in respect of market size in the future; notwithstanding, the Odu’a Republic holds some promise.
The Hausa, along with their cousins, the Fulani, will also constitute a viable Hausa or Arewa republic. The entity may have an estimated population of over 70 million with a rich tradition of entrepreneurship. The experience of running city-states and later the Sokoto Caliphate has equipped them with huge capacity in statecraft and leadership. Kano has been a commercial centre since the days of trans-Saharan trade, along with defunct Mali and Songhai empires. It is now the commercial hub for the Northern economy, which will be a huge advantage. Its challenges may include being landlocked, vagaries of climate, and loss of “junior partners.”
The Igbo may have their Biafra after the divorce. Like the Yoruba and Hausa, the Ndigbo have the population to constitute a viable state. They are also a people with a huge entrepreneurial drive and are highly mobile—two traits that were cultivated after the nation’s civil war in 1970, contrary to the widely held notion that the Ndigbo are intrinsically business-minded. For, before the war, most of them were actually public servants in federal agencies such as the NRC, ECN, the P&T, academia, and the civil service. The entrepreneurial spirit and other non-salutary tendencies were imbibed as a survival strategy—products of post-war necessities.
The possible downside of the Biafra Republic may have to do with being a landlocked nation unless its neighbours agree to tag along. So far, the probability of that has not been bright. The Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Kalabari nations that surround Igbo land do not seem enthusiastic about cohabiting in Biafra with them. It will require deft diplomatic outreach to bring them into the fold.
Unfortunately, the republican and acephalous nature of Ndigbo society has not prepared them for the needed political diplomacy and engagement outside textbook theories. The region may also have to contend with a constrained internal market and immigration frictions with its new neighbours. Already, the Ndigbo are not having it easy in faraway China, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Germany, South Africa, etc.
After the big three emergent nations would come the Middle Belt. It is likely to be loosely structured, amorphous, and highly diverse, like the Kwararafa. It is going to be a microcosm of present-day Nigeria with all its fault lines. The Kwararafa Republic, whether drawn along the current geopolitical North Central zone or ethnic minority lines, would require uncommon capacity to manage and administer harmoniously.
The new entity shall inherit both Christian and Muslim populations in almost equal proportion. There will also be decisive vestiges of indigenous Hausa, Fulani, and perhaps Yoruba in the mix. They will join over 200 other micro-ethnic nationalities. Currently, four out of the six states in the zone have elected Muslim governors. They include Kwara, Kogi, Niger, and Nasarawa (2K2N). The Christian governors are in Benue and Plateau. Proponents of the Middle Belt Republic may wish to include Adamawa and Taraba, but this too would bring one more Muslim governor from Adamawa and a Christian one from Taraba. So the Muslim influence continues. Cobbling all the diversity into one united, indivisible, and landlocked nation would be a nightmare.
With micro population, many can not be a viable nation state. Joining either Biafra or the Odu’a would amount to the substitution of an old master with a new one. Thus, head or tail, it may be tougher for some of the ethnic-nations that may emerge from the Middle Belt- whose voices have been among the loudest in Nigeria’s dismemberment campaign- to be viable Republics.
- G. Abubakar (ag******@gm***.com)
